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How important is financial development for economic development? A costly state verification model
of financial intermediation is presented to address this question. The model is calibrated to match facts
about the U.S. economy, such as intermediation spreads and the firm-size distribution for the years
1974 and 2004. It is then used to study the international data, using cross-country interest-rate spreads
and per-capita GDP. The analysis suggests a country like Uganda could increase its output by 140
to 180% if it could adopt the world's best practice in the financial sector. Still, this amounts to only
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chewang@iastate.edu1 Introduction
How important is ￿nancial development for economic development? Ever since Raymond W.
Goldsmith￿ s (1969) classic book, economists have been developing theories and searching for
empirical evidence connecting ￿nancial and economic development. Goldsmith emphasized
the role that intermediaries play in steering funds to the highest valued users in the economy.
First, intermediaries collect and analyze information before they invest in businesses. Based
upon this information, they determine whether or not to commit savers￿funds. If they
proceed, then they must decide how much to invest and on what terms. Second, after
allocating funds intermediaries must monitor ￿rms to ensure that savers￿best interests are
protected. Increases in the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial intermediation, due to improved information
production, are likely to reduce the spread between the internal rate of return on investment
in ￿rms and the rate of return on savings received by savers. The spread between these
returns re￿ ects the costs of intermediation. This wedge will include the costs of gathering
ex-ante information about investment projects, the ex-post information costs of policing
investments, and the costs of misappropriation of savers￿ s funds by management, unions, etc.,
that arise in a world with imperfect information. An improvement in ￿nancial intermediation
will not necessarily a⁄ect the rate of return earned by savers. Aggregate savings may adjust
in equilibrium so that this return always equals savers￿rate of time preference.
Figure 1, left panel, plots the intermediation wedge for the U.S. economy over time. (All
data de￿nitions are presented in the Appendix.) The United States is a developed economy
with a sophisticated ￿nancial system. The wedge falls only slightly. At the same time, it is
hard to detect an upward trend in the capital-to-output ratio. Contrast this with Taiwan,
shown in the right panel. Here, there is a dramatic drop in the interest-rate spread. As the
cost of capital falls one would expect to see a rise in investment. Indeed, the capital-to-output
ratio for Taiwan shows signi￿cant increase. The observation that there is only a small drop
in the U.S. interest-rate spread does not imply that there has not been any technological
advance in the U.S. ￿nancial sector. Rather, it may re￿ ect the fact that e¢ ciency in the
U.S. ￿nancial sector has grown in tandem with the rest of the economy, while for Taiwan it
1has outpaced it. For without technological advance in the ￿nancial sector, banks would face
a losing battle with the rising labor costs that are inevitable in a growing economy. The
intermediation spread would then have to rise to cover costs. More on this later.





































Figure 1: Interest-rate spreads and capital-to-output ratios for the United States and Taiwan,
1970-2005.
Now, in Goldsmithian fashion, consider the scatter plots presented for a sample of coun-
tries in Figures 2 and 3. Take Figure 2 ￿rst. The left panel shows that countries with lower
interest-rate spreads tend to have higher capital-to-output ratios. The right panel illustrates
that a higher capital-to-output ratio is associated with a greater level of GDP. Dub this the
capital-deepening e⁄ect of ￿nancial intermediation. Next, turn to the left panel in Figure
3. Observe that lower interest-rate spreads are also linked with higher levels of total factor
productivity, TFP. This would happen when better intermediation tends to redirect funds
to the more e¢ cient ￿rms. The right panel displays how higher levels of TFP are connected
2with larger GDP. Call this the reallocation e⁄ect arising from ￿nancial intermediation. The
capital deepening and reallocation e⁄ects from improved intermediation will play an impor-
tant role in what follows. While the above facts are stylized, to be sure, it will be noted that
empirical researchers have used increasingly sophisticated methods to tease out the relation-
ship between ￿nancial intermediation and growth. This literature is surveyed masterfully
by Levine (2005). The upshot is that ￿nancial development has a causal e⁄ect on economic
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Figure 2: The cross-country relationship between interest-rate spreads, capital-to-output
ratios and GDP.
The impact that ￿nancial development has on economic development is investigated
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Figure 3: The cross-country relationship between interest-rate spreads, TFP and GDP
4in Greenwood et al. (forthcoming). The source of inspiration for the framework is classic
work by Diamond (1984), Townsend (1979), and Williamson (1986). It has two novel twists,
however. First, the e¢ ciency of monitoring the use of funds by ￿rms depends upon both
the amount of resources devoted to this activity and the state of technology in the ￿nancial
sector. Second, ￿rms have ex-ante di⁄erences in the structure of returns that they o⁄er.
A ￿nancial theory of ￿rm size emerges. At any point in time, ￿rms o⁄ering high expected
returns are underfunded (relative to a world without informational frictions), while others
yielding low expected ones are overfunded. This results from diminishing returns in infor-
mation production. As the e¢ ciency of the ￿nancial sector rises (relative to the rest of the
economy) funds are redirected away from less productive ￿rms in the economy toward the
more productive ones. Furthermore, as the interest-rate spread declines, and the cost of
borrowing falls, there will be capital deepening in the economy.
The model is calibrated to match some stylized facts for the U.S. economy, speci￿cally
the ￿rm-size distributions and interest-rate spreads for the years 1974 and 2004. It does
an excellent job replicating these facts. The improvement in ￿nancial sector productivity
required to duplicate these facts also appears to be reasonable. It does this with little change
in capital-to-output ratio. In the model, improvements in ￿nancial intermediation account
for 30% of U.S. growth. The framework also is capable of mimicking the dramatic decline
in the Taiwanese interest-rate spread. At the same time, it predicts a signi￿cant rise in
capital-to-output ratio. It is estimated that dramatic improvements in Taiwan￿ s ￿nancial
sector accounted for 50% of growth.
The calibrated model is then taken to the cross-country data. It also does a reasonable
job predicting the di⁄erences in cross-country capital-to-output ratios. Similarly, it does a
good job matching the empirical relationship between ￿nancial development and average
￿rm size. Financial intermediation turns out to be important quantitatively. For example,
in the baseline model Uganda would increase its GDP by 140% if it could somehow adopt
Luxembourg￿ s ￿nancial system. World output would rise by 65% if all countries adopted
Luxembourg￿ s ￿nancial practice. Still, the bulk (or 64%) of cross-country variation in GDP
5cannot be accounted for by variation in ￿nancial systems.
There are other recent investigations of the relationship between ￿nance and develop-
ment that use quantitative models. The frameworks used, and the questions addressed,
di⁄er from the current analysis. For example, Townsend and Ueda (2006) estimate a version
of the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model to examine the Thai ￿nancial reform. Their
analysis stresses the role that ￿nancial intermediaries play in producing ex-ante information
about the state of the economy at the aggregate level. Financial intermediaries o⁄er savers
higher and safer returns. They ￿nd that Thai welfare increased about 15% due to ￿nan-
cial liberalization. Buera et al. (2009) focus on the importance of borrowing constraints
in distorting the allocation of entrepreneurial talent in the economy. This helps explain
TFP di⁄erentials across nations.1 Limited investor protection is emphasized by Castro et
al. (2009). They build a two-sector model to explain the positive cross-country correlation
between investment and GDP. They note that the capital-goods sector is risky. This makes
capital goods expensive to produce in poor countries with limited investor production, be-
cause of the high costs of ￿nance. An implication of their framework is that the correlation
between investment and GDP is weaker when measured at domestic vis ￿ vis international
prices. This is true in the data.
2 The Economy
The analysis focuses on two types of agents; to wit, ￿rms and ￿nancial intermediaries.
Firms produce output using capital and labor. Their production processes are subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The realized value of the productivity shock is a ￿rm￿ s
private information. All funding for capital must be raised from ￿nancial intermediaries.
This is done before the technology shock is observed. After seeing its shock, a ￿rm hires
labor on a spot market. When ￿nancing its capital a ￿rm enters into a ￿nancial contract
1 Erosa and Cabrillana (2008) also investigate the interplay between ￿nancial market frictions and the
allocation of managerial talent for explaining cross-country productivity di⁄erences, albeit with more of a
theoretical emphasis.
6with the intermediary. This contract speci￿es the state-contingent payment that a ￿rm
must make to an intermediary upon completing production. Hidden in the background
are consumer/workers. They supply a ￿xed amount of labor to the economy. They also
deposit funds with an intermediary that earn a ￿xed rate of return. Given the focus here
on comparative steady states, an analysis of the consumer/worker can be safely suppressed.
The behavior of ￿rms and intermediaries will now be described in more detail.
3 Firms





The productivity level of a ￿rm￿ s production process is represented by x￿. It is the product
of two components: an aggregate one, x, and an idiosyncratic one, ￿. The idiosyncratic level
of productivity is a random. Speci￿cally, the realized value of ￿ is drawn from the two-point
set ￿ = f￿1;￿2g, with ￿1 < ￿2. The set ￿ di⁄ers across ￿rms. Call this the ￿rm￿ s type. Let
Pr(￿ = ￿1) = ￿1 and Pr(￿ = ￿2) = ￿2 = 1￿￿1. The probabilities for the low and high states
(1 and 2, respectively) are the same across ￿rms. The realized value of ￿ 2 ￿ is a ￿rm￿ s
private information. For now take the aggregate level of productivity, x, to be some known
constant.
Suppose that a type-￿ ￿rm has raised k units of capital. It then draws the productivity
shock ￿i. It must now decide how much labor, li, to hire at the wage rate w. In other words,






i ￿ wlig: P(1)
Denote the amount of labor that a type-￿ ￿rm will hire in state i by li(￿) = li(￿1;￿2).
Substituting the implied solution for li into the maximand and solving yields the unit return
function, R(￿i;w), or
ri(￿) ￿ R(￿i;w) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1￿￿)=￿w
￿(1￿￿)=￿(x￿i)
1=￿ > 0: (1)
7Think about ri(￿) = R(￿i;w) as giving the gross rate of return on a unit of capital invested
in a type-￿ ￿rm, given that state ￿i occurs.
4 Financial Intermediaries
Intermediation is competitive. Intermediaries raise funds from consumers and lend them to
￿rms. Even though an intermediary knows a ￿rm￿ s type, ￿, it cannot observe the state of
a ￿rm￿ s business either costlessly or perfectly.2 That is, the intermediary cannot costlessly
observe ￿, o and l. Suppose a ￿rm￿ s true productivity in a period is ￿i. It reports to
the intermediary that its productivity is ￿j, which may di⁄er from ￿i. The intermediary
can audit this report. It seems reasonable to presume that the odds of detecting fraud are
increasing the amount of labor devoted to verifying the claim, lmj, decreasing in the size of
the loan, k￿ because there will be more activity to monitor￿ and rising in the productivity
of the monitoring technology, z. Let Pij(lmj;k;z) denote the probability that the ￿rm is
caught cheating conditional on the following: (1) the true realization of productivity is ￿i;
(2) the ￿rm makes a report of ￿j; (3) the intermediary allocates lmj units of labor to monitor
the claim; (4) the size of loan is k (which represents the scale of the project); (5) the level of
productivity in the monitoring activity is z. The function Pij(lmj;k;z) is increasing in lmj
and z, and decreasing in k. Additionally, let Pij(lmj;k;z) = 0 if the ￿rm truthfully reports
2 Recall that the intermediary knows the ￿rm￿ s type, ￿. One could think about this as representing the
activity, industry or sector that a ￿rm operates within. For instance, Castro et al. (2009, Figure 3) present
data suggesting that the capital-goods sector is riskier than the consumption goods one. It would be possible
to have a screening stage where the intermediary veri￿es the initial type of a ￿rm. The easiest way to do
this would be to have them pay a cost that varies with loan size to discover ￿. If the ￿rm￿ s type can￿ t be
undercovered perfectly, as in the classic work of Boyd and Prescott (1986), then it may be possible to design
the contract to reveal it.
8that its type is ￿i (i.e., when j = i). A convenient formulation for Pij(lmj;k;z) is3
Pij(lmj;k;z) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 ￿ 1
￿(z=k) (lmj)￿ < 1; with 0 <  ;￿ < 1;
for a report ￿j 6= ￿i;
0; for a report ￿j = ￿i:
(2)
The intermediary makes a ￿rm a loan of size k. In exchange for the loan the ￿rm will
make some speci￿ed state-contingent payment to the intermediary. The rents that accrue
to a ￿rm will depend upon the true state of its technology, ￿i, the state that it reports, ￿j,
plus the outcome of any monitoring that is done. Clearly, a ￿rm will have no incentive to
misreport when the bad state, ￿1, occurs. Likewise, the intermediary will never monitor a
good report, ￿j = ￿2. It will just audit bad ones, ￿j = ￿1. If it ￿nds malfeasance, then
the intermediary should exert maximal punishment, which amounts to seizing everything or
r2k. If it doesn￿ t, then it should take all of the bad state returns, or r1k. These latter two
features help to create, in a least-cost manner, an incentive for the ￿rm to tell the truth.
The above features are embedded into the contracting problem presented below. A more
formal, step-by-step analysis is presented in Greenwood et al. (forthcoming).
Turn now to the contracting problem. Intermediation is competitive. Therefore, an
intermediary must choose the details of the ￿nancial contract to maximize the expected
rents for a ￿rm. Competition implies that all intermediaries will earn zero pro￿ts on their
lending activity. Suppose that intermediaries can raise funds from savers at the interest
rate b r. If the depreciation rate on physical capital is ￿, then the cost of supplying capital is
e r = b r + ￿. The intermediary￿ s optimization problem can be expressed as4
v ￿ max
k;lm1
f￿2[1 ￿ P21(lm1;k;z)][r2(￿) ￿ r1(￿)]kg; P(2)
3 To guarantee that Pij(lm
j ;k;z) ￿ 0, this speci￿cation requires that some minimal level of labor must
be devoted to monitoring; i.e., lm
j > ￿1=￿(k=z)
 =￿
. Note that this minimal labor requirement for monitoring
can be made arbitrarily small by picking a large enough value for ". The choice of " can be thought of as
normalization relative to the level of productivity in the production of monitoring services￿ see Greenwood
et al. (forthcoming) for more detail.
4 This is the dual of the problem presented in Greenwood et al. (forthcoming).
9subject to
[￿1r1(￿) + ￿1r2(￿)]k ￿ ￿2[1 ￿ P21(lm1;k;z)][r2(￿) ￿ r1(￿)]k ￿ ￿1wlm1 = e rk: (3)
The objective function P(2) gives the expected rents for a ￿rm. These rents accrue from the
fact that the ￿rm has private information about its state. Suppose that the ￿rm lies about
being in the good state. When it doesn￿ t get caught it can pocket the amount [r2(￿)￿r1(￿)]k.
The odds of not getting caught are 1￿P21(lm1;k;z). The good state occurs with probability
￿2. An incentive compatible contract o⁄ers the ￿rm the same amount from telling the truth
that it can get from lying.5 Equation (3) is the intermediary￿ s zero-pro￿t condition. The
expected return from the project is [￿1r1(￿) + ￿1r2(￿)]k. Out of this the intermediary must
give the ￿rm ￿2[1￿P21(lm1;k;z)][r2(￿)￿r1(￿)]k. The expected cost of monitoring low-state
returns is ￿1wlm1. Represent the amount of labor required to monitor a type-￿ ￿rm in
state 1 by lm1(￿) = lm1(￿1;￿2). The contract presumes that the intermediary is committed
to monitoring all reports of a bad state. Last, for some types of ￿rms a loan may entail a
loss. The intermediary will not lend to these ￿rms.
5 Stationary Equilibrium
The focus of the analysis is on stationary equilibria. Firms di⁄er by type, ￿ = (￿1;￿2) with
￿1 < ￿2. Denote the space of types by T ￿ R2
+. Suppose that ￿rms are distributed over
5 Let p2 represent the payment that a ￿rm makes to the intermediary in the good state. The incentive
constraint for the contract will read
[1 ￿ P21(lm
1 ;k;z)][r2(￿) ￿ r1(￿)]k ￿ r2(￿)k ￿ p2:
The left-hand side represents what the ￿rm will get by lying, while the right-hand side shows what it will
receive when it tells the truth. The latter must dominate, in a weak sense, the former. (Recall that upon
the declaration of a bad state the ￿rm must turn over r1(￿)k to the intermediary. So, it will make nothing
when it truthfully reports a bad state. If the ￿rm gets caught cheating, then it must make the payment
r2(￿)k, so it will also earn zero rents here.) The incentive constraint will bind. Thus, P(2) maximizes the
￿rm￿ s expected rents, ￿2[r2(￿)k ￿ p2], subject to the zero-pro￿t constraint. As in Townsend (1979), it can
be shown that the revelation principle holds, so the focus here on incentive compatible contracts is without
loss of generality.
10productivities in accordance with the distribution function
F(x;y) = Pr(￿1 ￿ x;￿2 ￿ y).
For all ￿rms ￿x the odds of drawing state i at Pr(￿ = ￿1) = ￿i. This distribution F can then
be thought of as specifying the mean, ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2, and variance, ￿1￿2(￿1 ￿ ￿2)2, of project
returns across ￿rms. So, which ￿rms will receive funding in equilibrium?
To answer this question, focus on the zero pro￿t condition for intermediaries (3). Now,
consider a ￿rm of type ￿. Clearly, if ￿1r1(￿)k + ￿1r2(￿)k < 0, then the intermediary will
incur a loss on any loan of size k > 0. Likewise, if ￿1r1k + ￿1r2k > 0, then it will be
possible to make non-negative pro￿ts, albeit the loan may have to be very small. Therefore,
a necessary and su¢ cient condition to obtain funding is that ￿ lies in the set A(w) ￿ T
de￿ned by
A(w) ￿ f￿ : ￿1r1(￿) + ￿2r2(￿) ￿ e r > 0g: (4)
This set shrinks with the wage, w, because ri(￿) is decreasing in w; as wages rise a ￿rm
becomes less pro￿table.
Firms with ￿ 2 A(w) will demand li(￿1;￿2) units of labor in state i. Should one of these
￿rms declare that it is in state 1, then the intermediary will send lm1(￿1;￿2) units of labor
over to audit it. Recall that labor is in ￿xed supply. Suppose that there is one unit in
aggregate. The labor-market-clearing condition will then appear as
Z
A(w)
[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2) + ￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2) = 1. (5)
It is now time to take stock of the situation thus far by presenting a de￿nition of the
equilibrium under study.
De￿nition 1 Set the steady-state cost of capital at e r. A stationary competitive equilibrium
is described by a set of labor allocations, li and lm1, a set of active ￿rms, A(w), together
with a loan size, k, and a value, v, for each ￿rm, and ￿nally a wage rate, w, such that:
1. The loan, k, o⁄ered by the intermediary maximizes the value of a ￿rm, v, in line with
P(2), given the prices e r and w. The intermediary hires labor for monitoring in the
amount lm1, as also speci￿ed by P(2).
112. A ￿rm is o⁄ered a loan if and only if it lies in the active set, A(w), as de￿ned by (4).
3. Firms hire labor li, so as to maximize its pro￿ts in accordance with P(1), given wages,
w, and the size of the loan, k, o⁄ered by the intermediary.
4. The wage rate, w, is determined so that the labor market clears, in accordance with
(5).
6 Discussion
The analysis focuses on the role that intermediaries play in producing information. Before
an investment opportunity is funded, intermediaries assess its risk and return. In the current
setting, this amounts to knowing a project￿ s type, ￿. This can be costlessly discovered in
the model here. It would be easy to add a variable cost for a loan that is a function of z.
Doing so would have little bene￿t, however. Intermediaries need to put systems in place to
monitor cash ￿ ows, or face the prospect of lower-than-promised returns. In yesteryear, banks
required borrowers to keep their funds in an account with them. This way transactions could
be monitored. Now, even a privately funded ￿rm needs to be monitored, unless the scale
is so small that the owner can operate it himself. Managers and workers tend to siphon o⁄
funds from the providers of capital, whether they are banks, bondholders, private owners,
share holders, or venture capitalists. At the micro level, this is what a shirking worker in
a fast food restaurant is doing. And, there is computer surveillance software available for
$200 a month, called HyperActive Bob, designed to catch such a person.6
E¢ ciency of monitoring, z, is likely to depend on the state of technology in the ￿nancial
sector, both in terms of human and physical capital. Better information technologies al-
low for greater quantities of ￿nancial information to be collected, exchanged, processed and
analyzed. Indeed, the most IT-intensive industry in the United States is Depository and
Nondepository Financial Institutions. Computer equipment and software services accounted
for 10% of value added over the period 1995 to 2000, as opposed to 5% in Industrial Machin-
ery and Equipment, or 2.6% in Radio and Television Broadcasting. Berger (2003) discusses
6 ￿Machines that can see.￿The Economist, March 5th 2009.
12the importance of IT in accounting for productivity gains in the U.S. banking sector. This is
re￿ ected in the growth of ATM machines, Internet banking, electronic payment technologies,
and information exchanges that permit the use of economic models to undertake credit scor-
ing for small businesses, develop investment strategies, create new exotic ￿nancial products,
etc. Similarly, a more talented work force allows for higher-quality information workers: ac-
countants, ￿nancial analysts, and lawyers. Last, the e¢ ciency of monitoring will depend on
the legal environment, which speci￿es what information can, must, or must not be produced.
This is separate from regulating the terms of payments, especially in bankruptcy (here p1 or
p12) as analyzed in Castro et al. (2004).
Before proceeding on to the quantitative analysis, some mechanics of the above framework
will now be inspected in a heuristic manner. For a more formal analysis see Greenwood et
al. (forthcoming). The presence of diminishing returns to information production leads to a
￿nancial theory of ￿rm size, as will be discussed. In fact, they can be thought of as providing
a microfoundation for the Lucas (1978) span of control model. The framework also speci￿es
a link between the state of ￿nancial development and the state of economic development.
(1) A ￿rm￿ s production is governed by constant returns to scale. In the absence of ￿nan-
cial market frictions, no rents would be earned on production. Additionally, in a frictionless
world only ￿rms o⁄ering the highest expected return would be funded. In this situation,
max￿[￿1r1(￿) + ￿2r2(￿)] = e r￿ cf (4). With ￿nancial market frictions, ￿1r1(￿) + ￿2r2(￿) > e r
for all funded projects ￿ 2 A(w), a fact easily gleaned from (3). Thus, deserving projects￿
those ￿ 2 B(w) ￿ fx : maxx2T [￿1r1(x)+￿2r2(x)]g￿ will be underfunded, while undeserving
projects￿ ￿ = 2 B(w)￿ are simultaneously overfunded. Funded ￿rms will earn rents, v, as
given by P(2).
(2) What determines the size of a ￿rm￿ s loan? By eyeballing the left-hand side of (3),
which details the intermediary￿ s pro￿ts, it looks likely that the ￿rm￿ s loan will be increasing
in the project￿ s expected return, ￿1r1(￿) + ￿1r2(￿), ceteris paribus. This is true. Recall
that the odds of detecting fraud, P21(lm1;k;z), decrease in loan size, k. Therefore, more
labor must be allocated to monitoring the project in response to an increase in loan size.
13Since there are diminishing returns to information production, the size of the loan, k, is
uniquely determined as function of expected return. Similarly, it appears that a ￿rm￿ s loan
will decrease in the project￿ s risk, as measured by r2(￿)￿r1(￿). This is also true. When the
spread between the high and low states widens, there is more of an incentive for the ￿rm
to misreport its returns. Recall that the gain from lying is given by the objective function
in P(2). To counter this the intermediary must devote more labor to monitoring. The
diminishing returns to information production imply that loan size is uniquely speci￿ed as
a function of risk.
(3) Imagine that aggregate productivity, x, grows over time at the constant rate g1=￿.
Will there be balanced growth? Conjecture that along a balanced growth path the k￿ s, o￿ s,
and w, will all grow at rate g. Also guess that A(w) and the li￿ s, lm
1 ￿ s, and ri(￿)￿ s will remain
constant. It is easy to see from the isoelastic forms of P(1) and (1) that the conjectured
solution for balanced growth solution will be satis￿ed for the li￿ s, lm
1 ￿ s, and ri(￿)￿ s. Since the
ri(￿)￿ s remain constant so does the active set, A(w), that is spelled out in (4). Since the li￿ s
and lm
1 ￿ s remain ￿xed, if the labor-market clearing condition (5) holds at one point along
the balanced path it will hold at all others. So, the hypothesized solution for w is consistent
with this. What about k? The solution guessed for k is consistent with P(2), if P12 does not
change along a balanced growth path. From (2) it is clear that the odds of getting caught
cheating, P21, will change over time, however, unless z grows at precisely the rate g. If this
happens, then balanced growth occurs.
(4) Consider the case where x grows at a di⁄erent rate than z. Speci￿cally, for illustrative
purposes, take the extreme situation where z rises while x remains ￿xed. Thus, there is only
￿nancial innovation in the economy. By inspecting (2) the odds of detecting fraud will rise,
other things equal. The rents that ￿rms can make will drop, a fact that is evident from
the objective function in P(2). This makes it feasible for ￿nancial intermediaries to o⁄er
￿rms larger loans, ceteris paribus, as can be gleaned from (3). The implied increase in the
economy￿ s aggregate capital stock will then drive up wages. Thus, ine¢ cient ￿rms will have
their funding cut, as (4) makes clear. Therefore, ￿nancial innovation operates to weed out
14unproductive ￿rms. The active set of ￿rms, A(w), thus shrinks. Average ￿rm size in the
economy is the total stock of labor (one) divided by the number of ￿rms (or the measure
of the active set). Therefore, average ￿rm size increases. If z increases without bound,
then the economy will enter into a frictionless world where only ￿rms o⁄ering the highest
expected return, max￿[￿1r1(￿) + ￿2r2(￿)], are funded. These ￿rms will earn no rents; i.e.,
max￿[￿1r1(￿) + ￿2r2(￿)] = e r.
7 The United States and Taiwan
7.1 Fitting the Model to the U.S. Economy
The quantitative analysis will now begin. To simulate the model, values must be assigned
to its parameters. This will be done by calibrating the framework to match some stylized
facts. Some parameters are standard. They are given conventional values. Capital￿ s share
of income, ￿, is chosen to be 0:35, a very standard number.7 Likewise, the depreciation
rate, ￿, is set to 0:06, another very common ￿gure.8 The chosen value for return on savings
through an intermediary is e r = 0:03.9
Nothing is known about the appropriate choice for parameters governing the interme-
diary￿ s monitoring technology   and ￿. Similarly, little is known about the distribution of
returns facing ￿rms. Let ￿￿1 be the mean across ￿rms for the logarithm of low shock, ￿1; i.e.,
￿￿1 ￿
R




the variance over ￿rms for the low shock; i.e., ￿2
￿j ￿
R
[ln(￿j) ￿ ￿￿j]2dF, for j = 1;2. In a
similar vein, ￿ will represent the correlation between the low and high shocks, ln(￿1) and
ln(￿2), in the type distribution for ￿rms. Assume that these means and variances of ￿rm-level
7 Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004) use a capital share of 0.36, close to the
number imposed here.
8 The same number is used, for instance, by Chari et al. (1997).
9 For the period 1800 to 1990, Siegel (1992) estimates the real return on bonds, with a maturity ranging
from 2 to 20 years, to be between 3.36% (geometric mean) and 3.71% (arithmetic mean). He also estimates
the real return on 90 day commercial paper to be between 2.95% (geometric mean) and 3.13% (arithmetic
mean).
15ln(TFP) are distributed according to a bivariate truncated normal, N(￿￿1;￿￿2;￿2
￿1;￿2
￿2;￿).
Normalize ￿￿1 to be 1. Of course, values for the parameters determining the productivities
of the technologies used in the production and ￿nancial sectors, x and z, are also needed.
Let Targetsj represent the j-th component of a n-vector of observations that the model
should match. Similarly, M(param) denotes the model￿ s prediction for this vector. The cali-
bration procedure will minimize the distance between the vectors Targets and M (param):
The key, then, is to choose targets that will be tightly connected to the model￿ s parameters.
The technological parameters, x and z, are very important for determining the e¢ ciencies of
the production and ￿nancial sectors. In particular, the model provides a mapping between
the aggregate level of output (per person), o, and the interest-rate spread, s, on the one
hand, and the state of technology in its production and ￿nancial sectors, x and z, on the
other. Represent this mapping by (o;s) = O(x;z;p); where p = (￿; ;￿;￿￿2;￿2
￿1;￿2
￿2;￿), rep-
resents the remaining 7 parameters in param (where ￿￿1 is normalized to one and hence is
omitted). Now, while the states of the technologies in these sectors are unobservable directly,
this mapping can be used to make an inference about (x;z), given an observation on (o;s),
by using the relationship
(x;z) = O
￿1(o;s;p): (6)
Given the importance of these two parameters, this condition will be used as a constraint
in the minimization of the distance between Targets and M (param). Equation (6) will
also play an important role in the cross-country analysis.
The distribution of returns across ￿rms will be integrally related to the distribution of
employment across them. Firms with high returns will have high employment, other things
equal. Figure 4 illustrates a ￿rm￿ s employment, l, as a function of its capital stock, k, and
the realized value of the technological shock, ￿. A ￿rm that receives a bigger loan, k, will hire
more labor, l, other things equal. Recall that the size of the loan is determined before the
technology shock is realized. Given the size of its loan, a ￿rm will hire more labor the higher
is the realized state of its technology shock. Given this relationship, the size distributions of
￿rms for the years 1974 and 2004 are chosen as data targets to determine the remaining 8
16parameters. Seven points on the distribution for each year are picked. As it is well known,
the size distribution of ￿rms is highly skewed to the right; that is, there are many small
￿rms, employing a relatively small amount of labor in total, and a few large ones, hiring a
lot. For instance, in 1974, the smallest 60% of establishments employed only 7.5% of the
total number of workers, while the largest 5% of establishments hired around 60% of workers.
Using only one target for the size distribution would be insu¢ cient to capture this fact. It
is important that the largest 12% of establishments employ 75% of the workers, but it is
equally important that the truncated distribution inside of the largest 12% of establishments
is also very skewed￿ remember that the largest 5% of establishments employed about 60%
of workers. Therefore, it is useful to consider the share of employment in the smallest 60,
75, 87, 95, 98, 99.3, and 99.7% of establishments. Thus, there are 7 targets for each of the
two years. Denote the jth percentile target for the year t by eUS






give the model￿ s prediction for this statistic (all for j = 60;75;87;95;98;99:3;99:7 and
t = 1974;2004).




























































Thus, following this strategy, 18 targets (including the oUS￿ s and sUS￿ s) are used to calibrate
11 parameters (including the xUS￿ s and zUS￿ s).
The upshot of the above ￿tting procedure is now discussed. First, there exists a set of




04 ), so that
the model can match exactly interest-rate spreads and per-capita GDP for the years 1974
and 2004. Second, the model does a very good job matching the 1974 and 2004 ￿rm-size
distributions￿ see the upper two panels. Across time the size distribution shifts slightly to
17 Labor, l
Capital, k Productivity, q
Figure 4: Employment, l, as a function of capital, k, and the realized value of the techno-
logical shock, ￿￿ model



































































Figure 5: Firm-size distribution, 1974 and 2004￿ data and model
the left, as the lower right panel of Figure 5 makes clear. The largest ￿rms account for
a little less of employment. Last, the parameters obtained from the ￿tting procedure are
presented in Table 1.
19Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter De￿nition Basis
￿ = 0:35 Capital￿ s share of income Conesa and Krueger (2006)
￿ = 0:06 Depreciation rate Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997)
e r = 0:03 Return to Savers Siegel (1992)
￿ = 32:57 Pr of detection, constant Normalization
  = 0:95 Pr of detection, exponent Calibrated to ￿t targets
￿ = 0:40 Monitoring cost function Calibrated to ￿t targets
￿￿1 = 1:0 Mean of ln(￿1) Normalization
￿￿2 = 3:05 Mean of ln(￿2) Calibrated to ￿t targets
￿2
￿1 = 0:53 Variance of ln(￿1) Calibrated to ￿t targets
￿2
￿2 = 0:61 Variance of ln(￿2) Calibrated to ￿t targets
￿ = ￿0:87 Correlation ln(￿1) and ln(￿2) Calibrated to ￿t targets
x1974 = 0:14;z1974 = 11:5 TFP￿ s Calibrated to ￿t targets
x2004 = 0:20;z2004 = 28:2 " "
7.2 The United States, Balanced Growth
It would not be unreasonable to argue, for the purposes of the current analysis, that the U.S.
economy is characterized by a situation of balanced growth. First, there is only a small shift
in the U.S. ￿rm-size distribution between 1974 and 2004, as was shown in Figure 5 (bottom
right panel). Second, the economy￿ s interest-rate spread shows only a modest decline￿ recall
Figure 1. Third, the capital-to-output ratio displays a small increase￿ again Figure 1.
Finance is important in the model. This can be gauged by undertaking the following
counterfactual question: By how much would GDP have risen between 1974 and 2004 if
there had been no technological progress in the ￿nancial sector? As can be seen from the
third panel of Table 2, output would have risen from $22,352 to $33,656 or by about 1.4% a
year (when continuously compounded). This compares with the increase of 2.0% ($22,352 to
$41,208) that occurs when z rises to its 2004 level. Thus, about 30% of the increase in growth
20is due to innovation in the ￿nancial sector. Likewise, the model predicts that about 12%
of TFP growth was due to improvement in ￿nancial intermediation. The ￿nancial system
actually becomes a drag on development when z is not allowed to increase. Wages rise as the
rest of the economy develops. This makes monitoring more expensive. Therefore, less will be
done. As a consequence, interest rates rise and the economy￿ s capital-to-output ratio drops.
Without an improvement in the ￿nancial system, the ￿rm-size distribution actually moves
over time in a direction (rightward) that is opposite to that shown in the data (leftward), as
can be seen by comparing the lower two panels of Figure 5. When there is no technological
progress in the ￿nancial sector there will be a larger number of small ine¢ cient ￿rms around.
Therefore, the smallest ￿rms in the economy (or the left tail) will now account for a smaller
fraction for the work force￿ see the lower left panel.
Now, monitoring and the provision of ￿nancial services are abstract goods, so it is di¢ cult
to know what a reasonable change in z should be. One could think about measuring pro-
ductivity in the ￿nancial sector, as is often done, by k=lm, where k is the aggregate amount
of credit extended by ￿nancial sector and lm is the aggregate labor that it employs. By
this traditional measure, productivity in the ￿nancial sector rose by 2.59% annually between
1974 and 2004. Berger (2003, Table 5) estimates that productivity in the commercial bank-
ing sector increased by 2.2% a year over this same period (which includes the troublesome
productivity slowdown) and by 3.2% from 1982 to 2000.
21Table 2: The U.S. Economy
Data Model
1974
Spread, s 3.07% 3.07%
GDP (per capita), o $22,352 $22,352
capital-to-output ratio (indexed), k=o 1.00 1.00
TFP 6.63
2004
Spread, s 2.62% 2.62%
GDP (per capita), o $41,208 $41,208





Spread, s 2.62 3.87
GDP (per capita), o $41,208 $33,656
capital-to-output ratio (indexed), k=o 1.02 0.86
TFP 9.12
Yearly growth in ￿nancial productivity 2.59%
7.3 Taiwan, Unbalanced Growth
Return to Taiwan, as shown in Figure 1. In Taiwan there was a large drop in the interest-
rate spread between 1974 and 2004. This was accompanied by a signi￿cant increase in the
economy￿ s capital-to-output ratio. This is clearly a situation of unbalanced growth. Recall
that model provides a mapping between the state of technologies in the production and
￿nancial sectors on the one hand, x and z, and output and interest-rate spreads, o and
s, on the other. This mapping can be inverted to infer x and z using observations on o
and s using (6), given a vector of parameter values, p. Take the parameter vector p that
22was calibrated/estimated for the U.S. economy and use the Taiwanese data on per-capita









2004). The results of the ￿tting
exercise for Taiwan are shown below.
So, how important was ￿nancial development for Taiwan￿ s economic development? To
answer this question, compute the model￿ s solution for 2004 assuming that there had been
no ￿nancial development; i.e., set zT
2004 = zT
1974. Almost 50% of Taiwan￿ s 6.1% annual rate of
growth between 1974 and 2004 can be attributed to ￿nancial development. It also accounts
for 20% of the growth in Taiwanese TFP. Taiwan had almost a 10% annual increase in the
productivity of its ￿nancial sector, as is conventionally measured.
23Table 3: The Taiwan Economy
Data Model
1974
Productivity, industrial x1974 =0.0383
Productivity, ￿nancial z1974 =0.4214
Spread, s 5.41% 5.41%
GDP (per capita), o $2,211 $2,211
capital-to-output(indexed), k=o 1.00 1.00
TFP 1.68
2004
Productivity, industrial x2004 =0.0897
Productivity, ￿nancial z2004 =16.267
Spread, s 1.96% 1.96%
GDP (per capita), o $13,924 $13,924





Spread, s 1.96% 9.66%
GDP (per capita), o $13,924 $5,676
capital-to-output(indexed), k=o 1.847 0.630
TFP 3.66
Yearly growth in ￿nancial productivity 9.89%
8 Cross-Country Analysis
Move on now to some cross-country analysis. In particular, a sample of 45 countries, the
intersection of all the nations in the Penn World Tables and the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
24and Levine (2000, 2001) dataset, will be studied. For each country j, a technology vector
(xj;zj) will be backed out using data on output and interest-rate spreads (oj;sj), given
the procedure implied by (6) while setting p to the calibrated parameter vector for the
U.S. economy. Erosa (2001) uses interest-rate spreads to quantify the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
intermediation on occupational choice. It is not a foregone conclusion that this can always
be done; i.e., that a set of technology parameters can be found such that (6) always holds.10
The results are reported in Table 9 in the Appendix. By construction the model explains all
the variation in output and interest-rate spreads across countries.11 Still, one could ask how
well the measure of the state of technology in the ￿nancial sector that is backed out using the
model correlates with independent measures of ￿nancial intermediation. Here, take the ratio
of private credit by deposit banks and other ￿nancial institutions to GDP as a measure of
￿nancial intermediation, as reported by Beck et al. (2000, 2001). (Other measures produce
similar results but reduce the sample size too much.) Additionally, one could examine how
well the model explains cross-country di⁄erences in capital-to-output ratios.
Table 4 reports the ￿ndings. The correlation between the imputed state of technology
in the ￿nancial sector and the independent Beck et al. (2000, 2001) measure of ￿nancial
intermediation is quite high￿ see Table 4 and Figure 6. Thus, it appears reasonable to use
10 Theoretically speaking, there is a maximum interest-rate spread that the model can match. When the
￿nancial sector becomes too ine¢ cient, it no longer pays to monitor loans. As z falls (relative to x) the
aggregate volume of lending declines. The wage rate will decline along with the economy￿ s capital stock. As
this happens, the r1￿ s rise￿ see (1). Take the ￿rms with the highest value of r1 and denote this by r1. By
de￿nition, r1 = r1(￿), where ￿ = argmax￿2T fr1(￿)g. Eventually, r1 will hit e r. At this point, a Williamson
(1986)-style credit-rationing equilibrium emerges. In the credit-rationing equilibrium, r1 = e r. Here type-￿
￿rms will pay the ￿xed interest rate r1. They will not be monitored. Because r2 > e r for these ￿rms, they
would demand as big a loan as possible. Thus, their credit must be rationed. The interest-rate spread on
these loans will be zero. Note that r1 can never exceed e r, because in￿nite pro￿t opportunities would then
emerge in the economy. Thus, the interest rate spread is a \-shaped function of z. (The interest-rate spread
also approaches zero as z ! 1, or when economy asymptotes to the frictionless competitive equilibrium.
As z ! 0 the fraction of loans that are not monitored will eventually approach one, implying that the
interest-rate spread will drop to zero.) The peak of the \ function is the maximum permissible interest-rate
spread allowed by the model.
11 The model predicts a positive association between a country￿ s rate of investment and its GDP. Castro
et al. (2009, Figure 1) show that this is true. As was mentioned, it is stronger when investment spending
is measured at international prices, as opposed to domestic ones. This puzzle could be resolved here by
adopting aspects of Castro et al.￿ s (2009) two-sector analysis.
25the constructed values of z for investigating the relationship between output and ￿nancial
development. Now, the backed-out measure for the e¢ ciency of the ￿nancial sector correlates
well with a country￿ s adoption of information technologies, as is shown in Figure 6 (upper left
panel). It also is strongly associated with a country￿ s human capital (upper right) and the
maturity of its legal system (lower right). These three factors should make intermediation
more e¢ cient, for the reasons discussed in Section 6. Indeed, Figure 6 (lower left panel) also
illustrates how the ratio of overhead cost to assets, a measure of e¢ ciency, declines with
constructed ln(z).
As can be seen, the capital-to-output ratios predicted by the model are positively associ-
ated with those in the data. The correlation is reasonably large. That these two correlations
aren￿ t perfect, should be expected. There are other factors, such as the big di⁄erences in
public policies discussed in Parente and Prescott (2000), which may explain a large part
of the cross-country di⁄erences in capital-to-output ratios. Di⁄erences in monetary policies
across nations may in￿ uence cross-country interest-rate spreads. Additionally, there is noise
in these numbers given the manner of their construction￿ see the Appendix.
Table 4: Cross-Country Evidence
k=o lnz with Beck et al (2000, 2001) k=lm with Beck et al (2000, 2001)
Corr(model, data) 0.62 0.81 0.82
Interestingly, Sri Lanka and the United States both have an interest-rate spread of about
4.2%. The model predicts the United States￿z is about 250% higher (when ln di⁄erenced or
continuously compounded) than Sri Lanka￿ s￿ the former￿ s ln(z) is 2.28, compared with 0.013
for the latter; again, see Table 9 in the Appendix. But, recall that the units for ln(z) are
meaningless, since monitoring is abstract good. If one measures productivity in the ￿nancial
sector by the amount of credit extended relative to the amount of labor employed in the
￿nancial sector, as was discussed earlier, then the analysis suggests that intermediation in the
United States is about 214% (continuously compounded) more e¢ cient than in Sri Lanka.
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Figure 6: The relationship between imputed ln(z) on the one hand, and measures of in-
formation technology, human capital, overhead costs to assets and the rule of law, on the
other
27does Sri Lanka ($33,524 versus $3,967). Therefore, given the higher wages, monitoring will
be more expensive in the United States. To give the same interest-rate spread, e¢ ciency
in the U.S.￿ s ￿nancial sector must be higher. Before proceeding on to a discussion of the
importance of ￿nancial development for economic development, note that the ￿ndings in the
next section do not change much if the model is matched up with overhead costs, perhaps
a more direct measure (see Figure 6), instead of the Beck et al. (2000, 2001) interest-rate
spreads.
8.1 The Importance of Financial Development for Economic De-
velopment
It is now possible to gauge how important e¢ ciency in the ￿nancial sector is for economic
development, at least in the model. To this end, let the best industrial and ￿nancial practices
in the world be denoted by x ￿ maxfxig and z ￿ maxfzig, respectively. Represent country
i￿ s output, as a function of the e¢ ciency in its industrial and ￿nancial sectors, by oi =
O(xi;zi)￿ this is really just the ￿rst component of the mapping O(x;z;p). If country i could
somehow adopt the best ￿nancial practice in the world it would produce O(xi;z). Similarly,
if country i used the best practice in both sectors it would attain the output level O(x;z).
The shortfall in output from the inability to attain best practice is O(x;z) ￿ O(xi;zi). The
United States turns out to have the highest value for x, and Luxembourg for z.
The percentage gain in output for country i by moving to best ￿nancial practice is given
by 100 ￿ [lnO(xi;z) ￿ lnO(xi;zi)]. The results for this experiment are plotted in Figure 7.
As can be seen, the gains are quite sizeable. On average, a country could increase its GDP
by 31%, and TFP by 10%. The country with the worst ￿nancial system, Uganda, would
experience a 140% rise in output. Its TFP would increase by 30%. While sizeable, these gains
in GDP are small relative to the increase that is needed to move a country onto the frontier
for income, O(x;z). The percentage of the gap that is closed by a movement to best ￿nancial
practice is measured by 100 ￿ [O(xi;z) ￿ O(xi;zi)]=[O(x;z) ￿ O(xi;zi)] ￿ 100 ￿ G(xi;zi).
Figure 7 plots the reduction in this gap for the countries in the sample. The average reduction
28in this gap is only 17%. For most countries the shortfall in output is accounted for by a low
level of total factor productivity in the non-￿nancial sector.
Therefore, the importance of ￿nancial intermediation for economic development depends
on how you look at it. World output would rise by 65% by moving all countries to the best
￿nancial practice￿ see Table 5. This is a sizeable gain. Still, it would only close 36% of the
gap between actual and potential world output. Dispersion in cross-country output would
fall by about 19 percentage points from 77% to 58%. Financial development explains about
27% of cross-country dispersion in output by this metric.
Table 5: World-Wide Move to Best Financial Practice, z
Increase in world output (per worker) 65%
Reduction in gap between actual and potential world output 35.6%
Increase in world TFP 17.4%
Fall in dispersion of ln(output) across countries 27.2% ( ’ 111.4% - 84.2%)
Fall in (pop-wghtd) mean of (cap-wghtd) distortion 20.8% (’ 23.4% - 2.6%)
Fall in (pop-wghtd) mean dispersion of (cap-wghtd) distortion 13.5% (’ 14.6% - 1.1%)
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) started a literature about the importance of idiosyncratic
distortions that create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers. Although
they do not identify the sources of those distortions, they show they can generate di⁄erences
in TFP in the range of 30 to 50%. Guner et al. (2008) analyze the impact that size-dependent
policies, such as the restrictions on retailing in Japan favoring small stores, can have in
an economy. Here, the presence of informational frictions causes the expected marginal
product of capital, ￿1r1 + ￿2r2, to deviate from its user cost, e r. The distortion is modelled
endogenously. De￿ne the induced distortion in investment by d = ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r. For a
country such as Uganda these deviations are fairly large. Figure 8 plots the distribution of the
distortion across plants for Luxembourg and Uganda. As can be seen, both mean level of the
distortion and its dispersion are much larger in Uganda than they are in Luxembourg. The
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Figure 7: Cross-country results: The impact of a move to ￿nancial best practice on GDP,
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Figure 8: The distribution of distortions across establishments for the Luxembourg and
Uganda￿ the model
It varies across plants a lot, as indicated by a coe¢ cient of variation of 32.7% (1.94%). If
Uganda adopted Luxembourgian ￿nancial practices the average size of this distortion would
drop to 1.4%. Its standard deviation across plants collapses from 9% to just 0.3%. The
elimination of this distortion results in capital deepening among the active plants. Average
TFP would rise by 26% in the model, as ine¢ cient plants are culled. For the world at large,
the average size of the distortion is 23.4%, with an average coe¢ cient of variation of 14.6%.
The mean distortion drops to 2.6% with a world-wide movement to best ￿nancial practice.
The average standard deviation across plants falls from 14.6% to a mere 1.1%.
Finally, the model predicts that larger ￿rms should be found in countries with more
developed ￿nancial systems. It is hard to come up with a comparable dataset for many
countries. Beck et al. (2006) argue that the best available alternative is to use the size of
31the largest 100 companies. They ￿nd that there exists a positive relationship between the
development of a country￿ s ￿nancial system and ￿rm size, after controlling for the size of the
economy, income per capita and several ￿rm and industry characteristics. As an example,
their estimation implies that if Turkey had the same level of development in the ￿nancial
sector as Korea (a country with a more developed ￿nancial system), the average size of the
largest ￿rms in Turkey would more than double.
On this, imagine running a regression of the following form for both the data and the
model:
ln(size) = constant + ￿ ￿ spread + ￿ ￿ controls:
Firm size in the data is measured by average annual sales per ￿rm (in $U.S.) for the top
100 ￿rms, as taken from Beck et al. (2006). For the analogue in the model, simply use
a country￿ s GDP divided by the measure of active set A to obtain output per ￿rm. Once
again the data for interest-rate spreads are obtained from Beck et al. (2000, 2001). Controls
are added for a country￿ s GDP and population in the regression for the data, while for the
model they are just added for GDP.12 The same list of countries is used for both the data
and model.
The upshot of the analysis is shown in Table 6. A negative relationship is found in the
cross-country data between the interest-rate spread and average ￿rm size. The model also
produces a negative relationship between these variables. The similarity between the size
of interest-rate spread coe¢ cient, ￿, for the data and model is reassuring. Additionally,
the data estimate of ￿ = ￿0:16 implies that if a country with an interest-rate spread of 10
percentage points (which is among the worst 5% of nations in terms of ￿nancial development)
could reduce its spread to just 1 percentage point (which would place it in the upper 5% of
countries), then the average size of its top 100 ￿rms would increase by 144%. This is roughly
12 The idea here is that larger countries, as measured by income or population, would tend to have larger
￿rms. In a frictionless world ￿rms could locate anywhere, so there would be no need for such a connection
to hold. Nontraded goods, productivity di⁄erences across countries, restrictions on trade, transportations
costs, etc., would all lead to a positive association between average ￿rm size on the one hand and income or
population on the other.
32in accord with the Beck et al. (2006) ￿nding discussed above, given that Turkey had one of
the worst ￿nancial systems while Korea had one of the best.
Table 6: Cross-Country Firm-Size Regressions
Data Model
Interest-rate spread coe¢ cient, ￿ -0.16 -0.19
Standard error for ￿ 0.07 0.03
Number of country observations 29 29
R2 0.51 0.93
9 Robustness Analysis
9.1 Intangible Investments and Capital￿ s Share of Income
Suppose part of investment spending is undertaken in the form of intangible capital. As
a result, measured investment may lie below true investment. This will lead to measured
income, GDP, falling short of true output, o. This injects an upward (a downward) bias
in the measurement of labor￿ s (capital￿ s) share of income. Speci￿cally, in context of the
standard neoclassical model, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, measured labor￿ s




￿ (1 ￿ ￿) > (1 ￿ ￿):
Corrado et al. (2007) estimate the amount of intangible investment that was excluded from
measured GDP from 1950 to 2003. They show that when output is adjusted to include these
unrecognized intangibles, true output, o, is 12% higher than measured output, GDP, for
the period 2000-2003. As a consequence, it is easy to calculate that
￿ = 1 ￿
GDP
o
￿ LSI = 1 ￿
1
1:12
(1 ￿ 0:33) = 0:41:
How does this larger estimate for capital￿ s share of income a⁄ect the analysis?
The calibration procedure described by P(3) is redone for the case where ￿ = 0:41. The
results are in accord with those obtained earlier. The model again ￿ts the U.S. data well.
33In particular, it matches the ￿rm-size distributions for 1974 and 2004 extremely well. With
no ￿nancial innovation, U.S. GDP would have risen by about 1.77% a year, compared with
its actual rise of 2.0%. Hence, ￿nancial development accounts for about 40% of the growth
in GDP. For Taiwan about 60% of growth is due to ￿nancial development.
Financial intermediation is now more important for economic development. World output
would increase by 88%, as opposed to the 65% found earlier, if all countries moved to the best
￿nancial practice. There is also a bigger impact on TFP. As a result, suboptimal ￿nancial
practices now make up a larger fraction of the output gap. A more detailed breakdown of
the results is displayed in the Appendix, Figure 9.
Table 7: World-Wide move to best financial practice, z
￿ = 0:41 (intangible capital)
Increase in world output (per worker) 88.2%
Reduction in gap between actual and potential world output 43.5%
Increase in world TFP 33.1%
Fall in dispersion of ln(output) across countries 34.4% ( ’ 111.4% - 77.0%)
9.2 Varying the Degree of Substitutability between Capital and
Labor
Let output be produced according to a CES production function of the form
o = [￿k
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(x￿l)
￿]
1
￿; with ￿ ￿ 1.
This production function will have implications for how labor￿ s share of income, LSI, will vary
across countries. To see this, think about the one-sector growth model. Here labor￿ s share
of income can be written as LSI= (w=l)=(w=l +rk) = 1=[1+(r=w)(k=l)]: Therefore, labor￿ s
share will rise whenever (r=w)(k=l) falls. With the above production function, ￿ = 1=(1￿￿)
represents the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Hence, in response to a
shock in some exogenous variable, z, it will happen that dln(r=w)=dz = ￿(1=￿)dln(k=l)=dz.
34If the shock induces capital deepening [dln(k=l)=dz > 0] then labor￿ s share will rise or fall
depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is smaller or bigger than one.13 In the
cross-country data, labor￿ s share either rises slightly or remains constant with per-capita
income. This suggests that for the quantitative analysis, ￿ should be restricted so that
1=(1 ￿ ￿) < 1, which implies ￿ < 0; i.e., capital and labor are less substitutable than
Cobb-Douglas.
Let ￿ = ￿0:38, roughly in line with Pessoa et al. (2005). The calibration procedure
described above is redone for this value for ￿. The CES framework does not ￿t the U.S.
￿rm-size distributions for 1974 and 2004 nearly as well as the Cobb-Douglas case. In fact,
if one allowed for ￿ ￿ 0 to be freely chosen in the calibration procedure, then a value
close to zero (Cobb-Douglas) would be picked. For the U.S. economy, the CES speci￿cation
predicts a rise in labor￿ s share from 69.5 to 70.2% as the economy grows. The model with
a CES production function has a di¢ cult time matching the observed large variation in
cross-country interest-rate spreads. Speci￿cally, it cannot match the very high interest-
rate spreads observed for some countries.14 All in all, both the U.S. and cross-country
data prefer the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation. With a CES production structure world output
would increase by 32%, if all countries move to best ￿nancial practice. This is lower than
the Cobb-Douglas case for two reasons. First, the model cannot match the high interest-
rate spreads for some nations. This limited the gain that these countries could realize by a
move to best ￿nancial practice. Second, the potential for capital deepening is more limited
the higher the degree of complementarity between capital, which is reproducible, and labor,
which is ￿xed, in production.
13 That is, r=w will decrease by more (less) than k=l rises when the elasticity of substitution is smaller
(greater) than one.
14 See footnote 10.
3510 Conclusions
So, how important is ￿nancial development for economic development? To address this
question, a costly state veri￿cation model is taken to both U.S. and cross-country data. The
model has two unique features. First, ￿nancial intermediaries choose how much resources to
devote to monitoring their loan activity. The odds of detecting malfeasance are a function
of this. They also depend upon the technology used in ￿nancial sector. Second, each ￿rm
faces a distribution of returns. Furthermore, there is an economy-wide distribution across
￿rms over these ￿rm-speci￿c distributions. These two features lead to a ￿nancial theory of
￿rm size. The framework is calibrated to ￿t the U.S. ￿rm-size distributions for 1974 and
2004, as well as the observed intermediation spreads on loans.
The analysis suggests that ￿nancial intermediation is important for economic develop-
ment. In particular, about 30% of U.S. growth can be attributed to technological improve-
ment in ￿nancial intermediation. Since there was little change in the U.S. interest-rate
spread, it appears that technological progress in the ￿nancial sector was in balance with
technological advance in the rest of the economy. Roughly 50% of Taiwanese growth could
be attributed to ￿nancial innovation. Given the dramatic decline in the Taiwanese interest-
rate spread, technological progress in the ￿nancial sector may have outpaced that elsewhere.
The model￿ s predictions for the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial intermediation in a cross-section of
45 countries matches up well with independent measures. It does a reasonable job mimicking
cross-country capital-output ratios. The average measured distortion in the world between
the expected marginal product of capital and its user cost falls somewhere between 17 and
21 percentage points. The average coe¢ cient of variation in the distortion within a country
is 28 to 29%. World output could increase somwhere between 65 and 88% if all countries
adopted the best ￿nancial practice in the world. Adopting this practice leads to funds being
redirected away from ine¢ cient ￿rms toward more productive ones. This reallocation e⁄ect
is re￿ ected by a rise in world TFP by 17 to 33%. Still, this only accounts for 36 to 45% of
the gap between actual and potential world output. This happens because the bulk of the
di⁄erences in cross-country GDP are explained by the huge di⁄erences in the productivity
36of the non-￿nancial sector.
11 Data Appendix
￿ Figure 1: For the United States, the spread is computed along the lines of Mehra et
al. (2009). Speci￿cally, the spread is de￿ned to be ￿Intermediation Services associated
with household borrowing and lending￿divided by ￿Total Amount Intermediated￿(see
de￿nitions of these below). The ￿Intermediation Services associated with household
borrowing and lending￿is computed as ￿Interest Paid￿minus ￿Interest Received￿mi-
nus ￿Services Furnished by ￿nancial intermediaries without payment Interest Paid.￿
These numbers are taken from the National Income and Product Accounts [NIPA,
Tables 7.11 (lines 4 and 28) and 2.4.5 (lines 89 and 108)]. The ￿Total Amount In-
termediated￿is taken from the Flow of Funds account (2000, Table B.100b.e.) This
number is Assets (line 1) minus Tangible Assets (line 2). For Taiwan, the spread
is obtained from Lu (2008). The initial capital-to-output ratio in each country was
normalized to one (to control for di⁄erent de￿nitions of the capital stock).
￿ Figure 2, Figure 3 and Section 8: The cross-country data for the interest-rate spreads
are taken from the Financial Structure Dataset, assembled by Beck et al. (2000,
2001) and revised in January 2009. It is de￿ned as the accounting value of banks￿net
interest as a share of their interest-bearing (total earning) assets averaged over 1997
to 2003. The numbers for the ￿nancial development measure are obtained from the
same dataset. They represent demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money
banks as a share of GDP, and are also averaged over 1997 to 2003. The other numbers
derive from the Penn World Tables (PWT), Version 6.2￿ see Heston et al. (2002). The
capital stock for a country, k, is computed for the period 1955-2003 sample period. The
starting value is computed using the formula k = i=(g+￿), where i is gross investment
(rgdpl*pop*ki in the PWT￿ s notation), g is the growth rate in investment, and ￿ is
rate of depreciation. The depreciation is taken to be 0.06. For the starting value, i
37and g are the average over the ￿rst ￿ve years available for each country (in general
1950 to 1954). From there on, a time series is constructed for each country using
kt = kt￿1(1 ￿ ￿) + it: Again, the numbers used correspond to the average over 1997
to 2003. A country￿ s total factor productivity, TFP, was computed using the formula
TFP = (y=l)=(k=l)￿, where y is GDP, l is aggregate labor, and ￿ is capital￿ s share of
income. A value of 0.35 was picked for ￿.
￿ Figure 5 (Firm size): The data are for establishments. They come from County
Business Patterns (CBP), which is released by the U.S. Census Bureau annually. Due
to a signi￿cant shift in the methodology employment by the Census from 1974 on, data
are only used for this time period. The horizontal axis orders establishments (from the
smallest to highest) by the percentile that they lie in for employment. The vertical
axis shows the cumulative contribution of this size of establishment to the employment
in the U.S. economy. Some data are shown below.
38Table 8: U.S. Establishment-Size Distribution Data, 1974 & 2004
Establishments with number of workers between:
Series 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500-999 1000 +
Year 1974
Establishments (# in 1,000￿ s) 2,411 739 463 309 103 55.9 17.5 7.61 4.39
Employees (# in 1,000￿ s) 4,591 5,222 6,582 9,714 7,223 8,615 6,112 5,286 10,153
Establishments 59% 18% 11% 7.5% 2.5% 1.4% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1%
Employees 7.2% 8.2% 10% 15% 11% 14% 9.6% 8.3% 16%
Year 2004
Establishments (# in 1,000￿ s) 4,019 1,406 933 637 218 122 31.3 11.5 6.83
Employees (# in 1,000￿ s) 6,791 9,311 12,598 19,251 15,037 18,314 10,662 7,815 15,295
Establishments 54% 19% 13% 8.6% 3.0% 1.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1%
Employees 5.9% 8.1% 11% 17% 13% 16% 9.3% 6.8% 13%
Source: County Business Patterns (CBP).
￿ Figure 6 (relationship between lnz and some other variables): Data for the ￿rule of law￿
are taken from the World Bank￿ s ￿Aggregate Governance Indicators, 1996-2008￿ ￿ see
Kaufmann et al. (2009). Data on personal computers are obtained from the World
Bank publication Information and Communications for Development 2009: Extending
Reach and Increasing Impact. The numbers for the ￿nancial development measure and
the ratio of overhead costs to assets are available in the revised version of the Beck et
al (2000) dataset mentioned above. Last, average years of education is based on Barro
and Lee (2001).
39Table 9: Cross-Country numbers, data and model
Country Data Model
Benchmark Counterfactual
K/Y Spread GDPpc x ln(z) K/Y GDPpc Spread ￿GDP ￿Gap ￿TFP ￿d
Uganda 0.28 0.101 1043 0.03 -2.62 0.59 4228 0.003 1.40 0.34 0.30 0.48
Ethiopia 0.37 0.031 705 0.01 -1.05 1.42 1478 0.002 0.74 0.17 0.16 0.15
Nigeria 0.61 0.096 1086 0.03 -2.50 0.62 4256 0.003 1.37 0.34 0.30 0.46
Guatemala 0.75 0.091 3786 0.07 -1.17 0.65 13264 0.005 1.25 0.45 0.27 0.42
El Sal. 0.90 0.064 4706 0.07 -0.38 0.86 13140 0.005 1.03 0.40 0.23 0.29
Costa Rica 0.95 0.060 8093 0.09 0.26 0.90 20859 0.006 0.95 0.47 0.21 0.27
S. Africa 1.00 0.049 8207 0.09 0.60 1.04 18997 0.006 0.84 0.42 0.19 0.21
India 1.01 0.032 2630 0.04 0.25 1.42 5235 0.003 0.69 0.22 0.15 0.14
Mauritius 1.09 0.028 14986 0.11 2.19 1.52 24821 0.007 0.50 0.36 0.11 0.11
Bolivia 1.16 0.052 2929 0.05 -0.53 1.00 7579 0.004 0.95 0.31 0.21 0.24
Kenya 1.18 0.076 1258 0.03 -1.99 0.75 4251 0.003 1.22 0.31 0.27 0.36
Pakistan 1.18 0.033 2479 0.03 0.09 1.37 5089 0.003 0.72 0.22 0.16 0.15
Sri Lanka 1.22 0.043 3967 0.05 0.13 1.16 8980 0.004 0.82 0.30 0.18 0.19
Morocco 1.28 0.049 3835 0.05 -0.16 1.05 9421 0.004 0.90 0.32 0.20 0.22
Nicaragua 1.34 0.075 3337 0.06 -0.99 0.76 10514 0.004 1.15 0.39 0.25 0.35
Colombia 1.35 0.062 6092 0.08 -0.09 0.88 16455 0.006 0.99 0.43 0.22 0.28
Philipp. 1.52 0.056 3565 0.05 -0.45 0.95 9475 0.004 0.98 0.34 0.22 0.26
Honduras 1.65 0.082 2273 0.05 -1.52 0.70 7780 0.004 1.23 0.37 0.27 0.39
Turkey 1.65 0.127 5559 0.10 -1.30 0.49 23021 0.007 1.42 0.59 0.31 0.59
Ireland 1.85 0.012 24344 0.11 4.28 2.33 27968 0.007 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.02
Uruguay 1.86 0.069 10269 0.11 0.27 0.81 27904 0.007 1.00 0.56 0.22 0.30
Mexico 1.97 0.065 7776 0.09 0.09 0.85 21049 0.006 1.00 0.48 0.22 0.29




K/Y Spread GDPpc x ln(z) K/Y GDPpc Spread ￿GDP ￿Gap ￿TFP ￿d
U.K. 2.09 0.026 24400 0.14 2.82 1.59 37075 0.008 0.42 0.46 0.09 0.09
Peru 2.12 0.075 4220 0.07 -0.75 0.76 13052 0.005 1.13 0.42 0.25 0.34
U.S. 2.23 0.042 33524 0.20 2.28 1.17 61061 0.011 0.60 1.00 0.13 0.16
Luxem. 2.36 0.009 45830 0.16 5.40 2.56 45830 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Portugal 2.40 0.022 16936 0.11 2.76 1.74 24977 0.007 0.39 0.30 0.09 0.08
N. Zealand 2.49 0.017 20605 0.11 3.43 1.99 27036 0.007 0.27 0.25 0.06 0.05
Israel 2.50 0.028 21106 0.13 2.57 1.54 33398 0.008 0.46 0.43 0.10 0.10
Iceland 2.57 0.030 25071 0.15 2.57 1.45 40607 0.009 0.48 0.54 0.11 0.11
Spain 2.58 0.035 19215 0.13 2.05 1.32 34266 0.008 0.58 0.50 0.13 0.13
Sweden 2.60 0.028 24582 0.14 2.72 1.54 38230 0.009 0.44 0.49 0.10 0.10
Nether. 2.62 0.020 25600 0.13 3.34 1.83 34881 0.008 0.31 0.36 0.07 0.06
Australia 2.63 0.015 25993 0.13 3.95 2.13 31620 0.008 0.20 0.23 0.04 0.04
Denmark 2.64 0.043 27246 0.18 2.03 1.15 51658 0.010 0.64 0.79 0.14 0.17
Belgium 2.69 0.022 24228 0.13 3.16 1.77 34089 0.008 0.34 0.37 0.08 0.07
France 2.71 0.029 24537 0.15 2.61 1.48 39189 0.009 0.47 0.51 0.10 0.10
Norway 2.73 0.024 32896 0.17 3.29 1.67 46414 0.009 0.34 0.56 0.08 0.07
Italy 2.74 0.033 22234 0.14 2.29 1.37 38087 0.008 0.54 0.53 0.12 0.12
Austria 2.84 0.025 26433 0.15 3.01 1.65 38748 0.009 0.38 0.46 0.08 0.08
Thailand 3.09 0.022 6659 0.06 1.86 1.76 10562 0.004 0.46 0.21 0.10 0.09
Finland 3.11 0.016 22207 0.12 3.59 2.04 28434 0.007 0.25 0.24 0.05 0.05
Switzer. 3.67 0.019 28363 0.14 3.54 1.88 37403 0.008 0.28 0.36 0.06 0.05


































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Cross-country results with intangible capital, ￿ = 0:41
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